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Abstract: The possibility for market participants to place their bids
in markets where they are not geographically located is investigated
in this paper. An iterative procedure enabling the simultaneous
clearing of those overlapping markets by transaction schedulers
while managing the resulting pre and post-contingency congestion
is proposed. Transmission losses are calculated during the iterations
and are accounted for by allocating them to the various transaction
schedulers. The procedure is illustrated and commented on a test
system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of a functioning Internal Electricity Market in
Europe has been subject to lots of discussions in the last years
[1]. Presently, inter-area trade is basically held through explicit
auction mechanisms for allocation of scarce interconnection
resources. This is performed via the posting by TSOs of
Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) values for importing and/or
exporting at each interconnection and the selling of consistent
transmission rights to the market actors. Although attractive in
theory, this approach has been found in practice to yield some
inefficient use of the network. The main reasons are: (a) it is
difficult for the participants to anticipate what the value of each
transmission line will be for them, (b) some participants tend
to hoard capacity that they don’t finally use, and (c) pancaking
of allocations appears when several borders are involved in a
transaction [2].
Hence, the implicit auction approach for congestion man-
agement, where the scarce transmission resources are allocated
implicitly at the time the energy market is cleared, is gaining
more and more ground [1]. This is the main way intra-area
congestion management is treated in some parts of North
America, with the several pool based Locational Marginal
Pricing (LMP) approaches [3]. Another implicit auction ap-
proach, called market splitting, has been used for years in
Scandinavian countries where in case of congestion the market
is split in two or more price areas [4]. Both the LMP and
the market splitting approaches require a centralized market
operator that combines the bids in a market clearing procedure.
But setting up a centrally operated single electricity spot
market covering the various areas in Europe does not seem
practically possible at present.
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Overcoming this issue, a method that has been put recently
into practice is the so-called market coupling method with
the famous Trilateral Market Coupling (TLC) approach that
couples the day-ahead markets of France, Belgium and the
Netherlands since 2006. Market coupling is an implicit auction
similar to market splitting but performed in reverse order: first
each sub-market is cleared and then these markets are coupled.
It is thus a method performing coordination among different
markets, each using its own rules inside its area [5].
In the TLC approach, the day-ahead markets of the three
countries are coupled. Those markets are operated by three
local Power Exchanges (PXs), namely APX, Belpex and
Powernext, who provide the IT systems and run the common
coupling algorithm. The involved Transmission System Oper-
ators (TSOs), namely RTE, Elia and TenneT, calculate cross
border capacities, set up physical exchanges, share congestion
revenues and pay the market coupling service fee that is
determined locally. The basic idea is that a market participant
interacts only with the PX of its area, while some central
calculations take care of energy being exported from low to
high price areas, within the limits of transfer capacity. The
extension of TLC to the five countries of the Central Western
Europe region (i.e. involving also Germany and Luxembourg)
has been announced for 2010.
The big advantage of TLC is that it offers to each market
participant of an area an available liquidity extended through-
out all three involved areas. On the other hand, one could
argue that the three PXs eventually make up a monopoly on
the inter-area day-ahead electricity trade; two or more market
participants cannot settle an inter-area transaction without
passing via their respective PX.
In [6], another way for coupling markets and handling inter-
area congestion has been proposed. The approach consists in
allowing participants (generators, large consumers) to bid di-
rectly in any market of the interconnection they wish, without
being obliged to do so via their local operator. Transaction
Schedulers (TS), each corresponding to an electricity market,
settle multilateral transactions among participants, while a
central entity coordinates the overall operation through in-
teractions with the TSs. The resulting overlapping markets
are cleared simultaneously via an iterative algorithm, with the
available transmission capacity fairly shared among the TSs
and the feasibility of the final schedules ensured at the same
time.
In [7], the algorithm proposed in [6] has been extended,
allowing market participants to place their bids simultaneously
2in more than one TS’s markets. Transmission capacity is
iteratively shared among the TSs as in [6], but an additional
level of iterations is added, allocating market participants to
the TSs finally scheduling them in their markets.
This paper extends the algorithm presented in [7], so that
it takes into account N − 1 security constraints, expressed in
terms of linear Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODF), as
well as losses, approximated as proportional to the square of
a branch active power flow.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. First,
the problem is formulated in Section II. In Sections III and IV
the iterative algorithm that was developed in [7] is recalled.
Section III also includes the extension to deal with N − 1
security constraints as well. Section V presents the proposed
treatment of losses. The overall algorithm is illustrated through
a small example in Section VI, while some conclusions are
provided in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let M be the number of TSs. Each TS clears the market it
represents, using its own rules. The outcomes are scheduled
generation-load quantities together with the corresponding
prices offered to each generator or asked by each load.
The clearing is typically formalized as an optimization
problem. For the mth TS it takes on the form:
min
gm,dm
{cTmgm − bTmdm} (1)
s. t. 1Tgm = 1Tdm (2)
0 ≤ gm ≤ gm (3)
0 ≤ dm ≤ dm (4)
where cm (respectively bm) is a vector containing the bids
of all generators (consumers) bidding in market m, gm (dm)
contains the quantities of generators (consumers) dispatched
by the mth TS, 1 is a unit column vector, (gm)i, i.e. the ith
element of vector gm, is the maximum power that generator i
is willing to produce for market m and equivalently for (dm)j .
Equation (2) expresses that each TS has a balanced schedule.
The vector of net bus power injections is obtained as the











Once this vector is known, branch power flows can be com-
puted using a model of the entire network. In this paper a DC
model of the interconnection is used. This is a commonly used
model in market clearing problems and it is well suited to the
linear computations presented in the remaining of the paper.
It is assumed that the various TSOs in the interconnection
assemble and share such a network model, which is used to
coordinate the overlapping markets simultaneous clearings.
Let B be the number of branches and N the number of
buses in the system. In order to assess the impact of the
power injection schedule on branch flows, we resort to the
well-known Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF)[4].
This yields the following relationship in matrix form:
p = S n (6)
where p is the vector of branch power flows and S is the B×N
matrix relating branch power flows to bus power injections,
and defined by:
(S)bk =
Xik −Xjk −XiN +XjN
xb
(7)
where i and j are the terminal buses of branch b, xb its
reactance, Xik the entry in the ith row and kth column of the
N × N bus reactance matrix X, and similarly for the other
entries. Assuming that bus N is the slack bus, the N th row
and the N th column of X have all zero elements.
The congestion management problem dealt with in [6], [7]
consists in coordinating the M independent and simultaneous
market clearings so that the resulting injection schedules nm
yield feasible branch flows, i.e. satisfy the constraints:
−p ≤ p ≤ p (8)
where p denotes the branch maximum acceptable flows.
Additionally, a basic security requirement in power system
operation is that the system should be able to withstand any
loss of one single element without entering into an emer-
gency situation. For the here-presented problem of clearing
overlapping markets, the above N − 1 security requirement
has been translated into the constraint that the power flows
resulting from the loss of any branch do not overload any of
the remaining branches.
Following the choice of a linear network model, we resort to
well-known Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODF) [4]. For
each branch, these factors result from the PTDFs of the system
configuration with and without the branch under question. The
LODFs are linear sensitivities, each of them giving the fraction
of the power flowing in a branch v before its outage, that is
flowing in branch b after the outage. Let L the B ×B matrix
of LODFs and pvb the flow in branch b that results after the
outage of branch v. We have:
∆pvb = p
v
b − pb = (L)bvpv (9)
where pb and pv are the bth and vth branch flows before the
outage of branch v. By definition of L, we have (L)bb = −1.
In (9) the pre-outage flows can be substituted by (6), which
yields the post-outage flow as a linear function of the injection
schedule:
pvb = (L)bvsvn+ sbn = ((L)bvsv + sb)n (10)
where sb is the bth row of the S matrix.
The N − 1 security criterion requires to check for each of
the B branches the B−1 power flows that take place after the
outage of another branch. Thus, for each pair (b, v) we check
a security constraint of the type:
−α pb ≤ pvb ≤ α pb (11)
where α ≥ 1 accounts for possible overload allowed in post-
contingency situation (typically 1.05 ≤ α ≤ 1.1).
Using (10) for every post-outage flow pvb yields a linear
relationship between the post-contingency flows and the pre-
contingency bus power injections.
The satisfaction of the B constraints in (8) as well as the
B× (B− 1) constraints of type (11) makes up the congestion
management problem dealt with in this paper.
3III. TRANSMISSION ALLOCATION LOOP
Initially the M TSs clear their markets independently of
each other. The bus injection vector defined in (5) is thus
available. The corresponding branch flows, as well as all
post-outage flows, can be computed. If no limit is violated,
the TS schedules can be approved. Otherwise, congestions
are managed through an iterative procedure, referred to as
“Transmission allocation loop”, and detailed hereafter.
Assume that the power flow pb in the bth branch exceeds
its upper limit:
pb = p̂b > pb (12)
Using Eqs. (5) and (6), this inequality can be rewritten as:∑
m
sb n̂m > pb (13)
where n̂m is the schedule of the mth TS, obtained as described
in the previous section. It turns out that sbn̂m is the participa-
tion of the mth TS in the bth branch flow. Obviously, all TS
participations add up to the infeasible branch flow p̂b.
From there on, the mth TS is required to change its schedule
from n̂m to a new value nm so that its contribution to the
branch flow pb is decreased by at least a specified amount
∆pm:
sb(nm − n̂m) ≤ −∆pm (14)
with the sum of all ∆pm values being equal to the branch





sbn̂m − pb (15)








∆pm = pb (16)
i.e. it will be decreased below or at its limit.
The same constraint decomposition is performed for all
overloaded branches. Thus, each TS is required to incorporate
constraints of type (14) into its market clearing problem (1-4).
In fact, (14) can be rewritten as:
sbnm ≤ sbn̂m −∆pm (17)
where the left-hand side represents the flow produced in
branch b by the schedule of the mth TS, and the right-hand
side can be interpreted as a reduced capacity allocated to that
TS. Branch overloads with opposite signs, i.e. with p̂b < −pb,
are treated in a similar way.
It is suggested that a coordinator is given the role to
collect the various TS intended schedules, check for possible
resulting constraint violations and, if needed, communicate to
the TSs constraints of type (14). Clearly, the choice of the
∆pm values dictates the way transmission capacity will be
eventually allocated to the TSs.
As discussed in the Introduction, an implicit auction ap-
proach, in which limited transmission capacity is allocated
in the course of clearing the (multiple) markets, is chosen
to deal with congestion management. In addition, only little
commercially-sensitive information, such as the cleared sched-
ules from TSs, are expected to be communicated between
involved parties for reasons of confidentiality and of practical
implementability. In this context, it is proposed to allocate
transmission capacity to TSs in proportion to their respective
utilizations of the congested branches.
Coming back to the overloaded branch b, this choice
suggests that the constraint (17), reflecting the share of the




The above equation is equivalent, as can be shown by using







Equation (18) suggests that the more a TS is using a
congested branch the more it has the right to keep on using it.
This goes towards increasing efficiency: the more a TS uses a
branch, the more this is likely to be valuable for its schedule.
On the other hand, (18) can be rewritten as
sb(nm − n̂m) ≤ sbn̂m∑
m sbn̂m
(pb − p̂b)
which shows that the more a TS participates in a congestion,
the more it has to participate in its alleviation. This meets the
objective of fairness and practical acceptability of the policy:
the larger the responsibility of a TS in a flow, the larger the
correction requested from this TS.
These two interpretations of (18) may look contradictory
at a first glance but are mathematically equivalent owing to
the choice of proportionality. Further discussion regarding this
choice can be found in [7].
Let us assume now that an N −1 constraint is violated, i.e.
for the given injections n̂m we have:∑
m
((L)bvsv + sb) n̂m > α pb (20)
for a pair (b, v).
One can see that this constraint violation depends on the





m svn̂m. The post-outage overload can be managed
by decreasing the pre-outage flow in either of the two involved
branches.
In the same way as we previously defined the participation
of the mth TS in the bth branch’s flow as sbn̂m, we can now
define the participation of the mth TS in the overload of the bth
branch after the outage of the vth one as ((L)bvsv + sb) n̂m.
Again, all TS participations add up to the post-outage overload
(20).
The effort to alleviate the congestion is again shared among
the TSs, with the coordinator being assigned the task to
communicate to every TS a constraint involving only its
own injection schedule in a way that if all TS satisfy their
constraints then the initial overload is cleared, as was the case
with (17). Let us call ∆p˜m the amount by which the mth TS
is requested to contribute to the congestion alleviation. Note
that this change refers to a post-outage flow, while the TS
is requested to modify its pre-outage schedule. This means
4that ∆p˜m can be obtained from a ∆p˜m change of the TS’s
participation in the bth branch flow, or by a ∆p˜m/(L)bv
change of its participation in the vth branch flow, or by an
equivalent change involving both flows.
The policy used to allocate the transmission capacity re-
mains that of contributing proportionally to the participation
in the (now post-outage) overload, i.e. ∆p˜m is such that:
∆p˜m∑





and the mth TS will have to clear again its market with the
additional constraint:
((L)bvsv + sb) (nm − n̂m) ≤ −∆p˜m (22)
A similar approach is followed for branches with∑
m ((L)bvsv + sb) n̂m < −α pb.
Iterations are performed between market clearings by the
TSs, on one hand, and Transmission allocation by the coor-
dinator, on the other hand, until an equilibrium is reached.
At every iteration constraints of type (14) and/or (22) may
be added if needed. After a branch overload has been solved
as described above, it should be prevented from taking place
again in subsequent iterations, for instance when other branch
overloads are handled. To this purpose, the inequality con-
straints (14) and (22) stemming from previous congestion
managements remain in effect when dealing with new con-
gestions.
IV. ENERGY ALLOCATION LOOP
As discussed in [7], an issue that could be raised with the
above described overlapping market structure has to do with
the risk for the final schedule to be far from what could be
reached by optimizing the whole system as a single market.
The reason is that some attractive market participants (e.g.
cheap generators), having placed their bids in a market, may
be excluded when the latter is cleared, and thus remain inactive
while they could still be used by another TS to reach a better
schedule.
The proposed solution consists in allowing market partic-
ipants to place their bids in more than one market simulta-
neously. After the market clearings, the participant should be
allocated to the TS from which it received the best offer (the
highest price to be paid if it is a generator, or the lowest
price to pay if it is a consumer). Price is the criterion used
to eventually select which TS a particular participant will be
assigned to.
An iterative procedure, referred to as “Energy allocation
loop”, is implemented by the coordinator to allow the pre-
viously mentioned simultaneous dispatching of the market
participants by all the TSs.
The procedure starts with the market participants placing
their bids, each consisting of a maximum quantity (correspond-
ing to available generation or to load asking to be served)
and one price per TS. After having cleared its market, the
mth TS communicates to the coordinator its demanded bus
generation vector gom and consumption vector d
o
m, together
with the corresponding price vectors pigm and pi
d
m.
For a given generator i, if the total power demanded
by the various TSs is below (or equal to) its capacity, i.e.∑
m(g
o
m)i ≤ (g)i, that power is simply allocated to the
various TSs as they requested. Otherwise, there is a conflict,
and the role of the coordinator is to take care that the generator
is finally dispatched at the most profitable possible prices. To
this purpose, the coordinator allocates the power to one or
several of the involved TSs by decreasing order of offered
price. In case several TSs compete for the same generator
with equal offered prices, the available power is shared in
proportion with the requested quantities.
Hence, generally, some TSs will be left with power imbal-
ances, and the markets have to be cleared again. In order the
power just allocated to a TS not to be available to the others,
the coordinator communicates reduced bounds (gm)i to the
latter TSs.
Thus, the TSs come up with new demanded quantities and
offered prices. At this stage, the coordinator repeats the above
procedure, with the following two additional rules:
1) what was previously allocated to a TS and is still
requested remains with that TS;
2) what was previously allocated to a TS and is not
requested any longer is made available to the other TSs.
These iterative adjustments lead to a gradual allocation of all
demanded generations. Loads are handled in a similar way,
but with the allocation performed by increasing order of prices
requested by the TSs in order to serve them.
The procedure terminates when each market is balanced, no
TS has incentive to further improve its schedule by dispatching
available generation or load, and no conflict is left for any
resource. The coordinator can now use the bus injections
stemming from TS allocated power quantities to proceed with
the execution of the Transmission allocation loop.
The overall procedure, thus, consists of two loops, an inner
(the Energy allocation) and an outer one (the Transmission
allocation)[7].
V. ACCOUNTING FOR LOSSES
In the Energy and Transmission allocation procedure pre-
sented down to here the transmission system has been assumed
lossless. However, losses correspond to a non negligible per-
centage of the energy production. Thus, it is appropriate, when
scheduling generation and allocating transmission capacity, to
also account for losses. The viewpoint adopted in this paper
is that each TS should be assigned the responsibility for the
losses it “creates” due to its schedule.
Typically, in DC model-based operations, losses are es-
timated and redistributed as negative bus power injections
throughout the system. In the absence of an accurate estimate
of losses, we resort to an approach where the estimation of
losses is performed iteratively while clearing the market [8],
[9].
Initially the branch flows are computed according to a
lossless model, as in (6). Then, the losses lb in each branch
b are calculated using the approximation lb = rbp2b , where
rb is the branch’s series resistance. Those branch losses are
translated into bus power withdraws, to be treated as loads
5at the next iteration. To this purpose, an additional power
withdraw lb/2 is assigned to each end bus of the branch.
New generation schedules are then computed in order to
compensate for the additional “loads” and branch flows are
again computed using (6). The branch losses can then be
updated based on the new flows, and so on. The procedure
is fast, it usually converges after three iterations.
The above technique can be easily applied to the overlap-
ping market problem, taking advantage of the already iterative
market clearing procedure to incorporate the updated bus
withdraws accounting for losses. This is easily added to the
Transmission allocation loop; the coordinator, after computing
the branch flows, calculates the corresponding losses as well.
But, since each of the M markets is power balanced, a mech-
anism is needed to share among the various TS the additional
generation needed to cover the bus withdraws stemming from
losses.
It is well known that responsibility for losses cannot be
assigned to market participants in a undisputable way (they
depend on the combined result of all bus injections). This is
















When allocating the losses to the various TSs, it seems
straightforward to allocate each term rb(sbnm)2 to the mth
TS. On the other hand, terms involving two TSs, i.e.
rb(sbnm)(sbnk), need to be shared among them. In [10],
the authors argue that it is not always fair to just equally
divide each such term between the two TSs, which would, for
instance, suggest that the mth TS is allocated rb2 (sbnm)(sbnk)
of responsibility for the term it shares with the kth one.
Different ways for allocating the bilinear terms have been
proposed.
We have followed the idea of allocating the bilinear term
in proportion to the square of each TS participation in the
branch flow. The motivation for this choice is the quadratic
relationship between power flows and losses. Hence, every
bilinear term is assigned as follows:








Thus, coming back to the loss allocation mechanism per-
formed in the Transmission allocation loop, the coordinator,
after computing the branch flows, allocates the branch losses to
the various TS and, together with the congestion management
constraints, it communicates to the TSs the corresponding bus
withdraws to cover in their new market clearings.
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
For clarity, we illustrate the features of the proposed ap-














































Fig. 1. Three-area test system (some branch capacities (in MW) are shown in
parenthesis next to the corresponding branches, while next to each generator
its available capacity (in MW) as well as its bid (in e/h) are shown).
inelastic, i.e. only the generators are bidding, and (ii) each
of the involved TSs serves the load of an area. Note that
the method is generally able to handle situations where each
TS serves loads dispersed throughout the system, or some
loads place their bids simultaneously to more than one TSs.
Thus, each TS dispatches generation, located anywhere in the
interconnection, so as to satisfy the load located in its area.
The three-area 15-bus system shown in Fig. 1 is used.
It consists of three five-bus areas, identified from the bus
names, each of them serving 600 MW of load. The three
areas are identical as regards the distribution of loads and the
location and capacity of generators. However, they differ by
the generator bids, which are the cheapest in area A and the
most expensive in area C. Each generator is assumed to make
the same bid to all three TSs (i.e. (cA)i = (cB)i = (cC)i). A
market clearing pricing mechanism has been used by all TSs
to come up with their offered to generators prices.
The generation schedules resulting after an execution of the
procedure are shown in Tables I and II, with and without
losses accounted for, respectively. Columns 3-5 present the
generation quantities that each TS finally managed to dispatch,
while column 6 is the sum of the three, making up the
total quantity dispatched for each generator. In column 7, the
generation schedule obtained by performing a single market
clearing over the whole system is shown. In this single clearing
all branch and post-outage branch flow limits are incorporated
as inequality constraints in the optimization problem. To this
purpose, the same PTDFs and LODFs are used as for the
proposed iterative procedure. Losses are accounted for by
resorting to the iterative method explained in Section V.
The last column of the table presents, for comparison, the
total generation schedules that resulted after an execution of
the procedure without considering N − 1 constraints. The
resulting generation costs, for all the above mentioned cases,
are grouped in Table III.
The fact that each TS finally allocated most of its generation
from inside the area where its load is located is indicative of
the followed congestion management rule; during the iterations
6TABLE I
FINAL GENERATION ALLOCATION (IN MW); NO ACCOUNT FOR LOSSES
Gen Bid incorporating N − 1 constraints without
TS A TS B TS C Total Single N − 1
gA1 5 105 25 25 155 155 249
gA2 4 110 50 50 210 210 250
gA5 8 232 115 74 421 420 382
gB1 11 43 100 0 143 155 157
gB2 10 110 100 0 210 210 300
gB5 18 0 210 71 281 270 262
gC1 30 0 0 210 210 210 0
gC2 30 0 0 155 155 155 0
gC5 35 0 0 15 15 15 200
TABLE II
FINAL GENERATION ALLOCATION (IN MW); ACCOUNTING LOSSES
Gen Bid incorporating N − 1 constraints without
TS A TS B TS C Total Single N − 1
gA1 5 105 25 25 155 155 250
gA2 4 110 50 50 210 210 251
gA5 8 229 116 83 428 428 391
gB1 11 48 100 7 155 155 156
gB2 10 65 100 45 210 210 300
gB5 18 46 214 12 272 273 267
gC1 30 0 0 210 210 210 0
gC2 30 0 0 155 155 155 0
gC5 35 0 0 17 17 17 207
TABLE III
FINAL GENERATION COSTS (IN e/H)
N − 1 losses TS A TS B TS C Total Single
yes no 4395 7127 13675 25197 25115yes 4817 7210 13271 25298 25300
no no 4093 6467 11184 21743 21300yes 4155 6572 11416 22142 21568
of the procedure each TS had been assigned the effort to
alleviate congestion caused by itself trying to import in its
area. Expectedly, the additional consideration of post-outage
branch flow limits (see Eq. (11)) decreases, compared to the
case when only pre-outage limits are considered (Eq. (8)),
the inter-area transmission capacities and, thus, obliges the
TSs to resort to generation located “closer” to the loads they
serve. This results in higher generation costs. Finally, one can
see that accounting for transmission losses results in all TSs
dispatching some additional generation, leading to a small
augmentation of the resulting costs.
The intention of the proposed method is not to perform a
single system-wide market clearing in a decentralized way,
but rather to allow participants to freely settle transactions
over a common transmission grid. However, the fact that it
seems to result in schedules with overall cost close to the
theoretical minimum (i.e. single overall clearing) appears to
be an attractive feature, since the opposite would suggest that
interesting generation capacities were not exploited.
VII. CONCLUSION
A transaction-based, decentralized market paradigm has
been outlined in this paper. In its essence, it is an approach
where market participants are left free to settle multilateral
transactions (done via the intervention of generic entities
called TSs) without them being dispatched by a central entity.
Whether it is preferable to operate a market in a centralized
manner or coordinate multilateral trades, has been extensively
discussed in the literature. A major advantage of the cen-
tralized approach is that transmission network constraints are
taken care of implicitly when clearing the energy market.
The choice/need for centralization stems from the difficulty to
efficiently coordinate multilateral trades being simultaneously
scheduled; it is not an objective by itself. On the contrary, it
goes with the principle of free trading to let market participants
the option to buy and sell electric energy in the terms they
agree between themselves. However, given the transmission
network constraints that couple the different transactions, it is
more challenging to coordinate them in a decentralized way.
This is the intention of the procedure proposed in this paper.
Both pre- and post-outage contingencies are implicitly handled
in the approach, while losses are also taken care of, at the same
time, by updating them within the iterations and allocating
them to the various TSs. According to the presented results,
the transmission network is efficiently used.
It should be noted that the Energy allocation loop can
be viewed as an optional feature of the procedure, offering
the extra possibility of market participants being a priori
available for the most profitable dispatch. The algorithm works
as well with the Energy allocation omitted; in this case, the
remaining Transmission allocation loop coordinates the use of
the network among the TSs, each of them dispatching purely
its own participants.
Issues of further interest are the possibly constraining time
for the iterations to converge, the exposure of the procedure
to gaming, as well as the accommodation of complex bid
structures.
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